Iran and Israel

Because the 2 powers do not share a border, the rivalry runs through a 2nd layer of actors: proxies, airspace and the Strait of Hormuz. The standing structure of Turkey's 1.8 million personnel, with its 170,000-strong active army, keeps the Turkish Straits and the southern flank of NATO in a state that shapes every escalation scenario. A map of the Middle East drawn around 2 lines of proxies, 3 no-fly corridors and 1 chokepoint reads better as a chessboard than a territory map.

The history of the rivalry

The rivalry is the product of the 1979 revolution, which turned a Cold War balance on its head. In 1967 Israel and Egypt were adversaries in the 6-day war; in 1968 Israel and Iran signed a protocol that opened a channel for intelligence and military cooperation; and by the 1970s Iranian pilots were trained at bases in Negev and Iranian officers studied at the United States military academy at West Point. The revolution of 1979 broke that channel, Israel closed the Tel Aviv embassy in 1980, and the two states moved from partners to the 2 poles of a rivalry that would last 47 years by 2026. The 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal and the 2018 US withdrawal from it added 3 new chapters: diplomacy, sanctions, and the open threat of force.

Proxy networks and the axis of resistance

The axis of resistance is the proxy system that carries the rivalry across borders, and it is built around 4 main pillars. Each pillar is a different kind of force, and each serves a different role in the 2024 and 2025 escalation cycle:

• Hezbollah in Lebanon: roughly 15,000 rockets and missiles, the densest short-range arsenal in the region, deployed from 1,000 launch sites in the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon.
• Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza: the 2023 7 October attack, in which the 2 groups killed 1,200 people and took 251 hostages, opened the 2nd front and triggered a war that lasted 14 months.
• The Houthis in Yemen: the 2023 Red Sea campaign, in which the 2 groups attacked shipping with 1,000 drones and missiles, forced the United States to lead a 2024 campaign of strikes that killed 1,100 of their fighters.
• Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq: roughly 50,000 fighters, of which 30,000 are under Iranian command, embedded in the 2 countries that host US bases.

The 4 pillars do not operate as a single army. They operate as a 2nd layer of deterrence, and Israel's 2024 campaign against the 2 of them in Lebanon and Syria was a direct attempt to collapse that layer.

The 12-day war of 2025

The 12-day war is the first open clash between the 2 states, and it ran from the 13 June 2025 Israeli strike on the 2 Iranian nuclear sites at Natanz and Fordow to the 24 June ceasefire. The 2024 exchange of strikes on 1 April and 13 April had already moved the rivalry from proxy war to direct war, but the 2025 campaign was 4 times larger. Israel deployed 500 aircraft, and the 2 countries exchanged roughly 1,200 missiles and drones in 12 days. The 2025 12-day war killed 45 Iranian soldiers, 15 Israeli soldiers and 1,000 civilians in Lebanon, and it ended with a US-brokered ceasefire that left the 2 nuclear sites damaged but not destroyed.

The 2025 war changed 3 things at once. It removed the taboo on striking inside Iranian soil. It showed that Israeli air power can reach Fordow, a site buried 90 metres under a mountain, and that Iranian missiles can reach the Haifa port, 350 kilometres away. And it pushed the 2 countries to the edge of a 3rd round that neither wanted to start.

Nuclear program and deterrence

The nuclear program is the 1 variable that can end the rivalry by force, and it is the 1 variable that has kept it alive. The 2015 JCPOA capped Iran's uranium enrichment at 3.67%, a level too low for weapons. The 2018 US withdrawal removed that cap, and by 2025 Iran was enriching to 60%, within 1 step of the 90% needed for a weapon. The 2025 strikes damaged the 2 enrichment sites, but the IAEA reported in 2026 that roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium remained unaccounted for. Israel's deterrence doctrine, first stated in the 1969 Dimona raid, has been 1 rule since 1948: a 2nd nuclear state in the Middle East is not an option. The 2025 campaign was the 1st time that rule was enforced with air power rather than with Mossad.

Mediators and the 2026 framework

The mediators are the 3 states that sit between the 2 powers, and they are the only ones that can keep the next round from starting. Turkey, Qatar and Oman each run a channel, and each runs it for a different reason. Turkey's channel runs through the 2 countries that share a border with both, and it is the 1 channel that Ankara has kept open since 2021. Qatar's channel runs through Doha, which hosts the 2 largest Al Jazeera bureaus in the region, and it is the 1 channel that Iran has used to talk to the United States since 2013. Oman's channel runs through Muscat, which has hosted US-Iran talks since 2013, and it is the 1 channel that has survived 3 US administrations. The 2026 framework, brokered by the 3 states in 2026, is not a peace treaty. It is a 20-page document that caps 3 things: the 2 countries' missile ranges, the 2 countries' proxy budgets, and the 2 countries' airspace over the Strait of Hormuz.

How the rivalry reshapes the wider region

The wider region is the 2nd layer of the rivalry, and it is where the 2 countries' policies meet the policies of the 5 other states that sit between them. The table below maps each state's position in 2026:

The 2 countries that do not belong to the rivalry, Egypt and Ethiopia, are the 2 countries that the rivalry cannot ignore. Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel is the 1 treaty that keeps Gaza from becoming a 3rd front, and Ethiopia's 2026 port talks are the 1 move that could close the Red Sea corridor that the Houthis keep open. The rivalry, in 2026, is not a 2-country affair. It is a 6-country system, and the 2 countries in the centre of it are the 2 countries that cannot stop talking.